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Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law: The Initiation 
of International Involvement 
 
Matthew Saul, (Lecturer in Law, Durham University. I would like to thank Linn Edvartsen, 
Aoife O‘Donoghue, and the anonymous reviewer for their very useful comments on earlier 
drafts of this article.)  
 
Abstract: 
 
This article seeks to help develop a clearer understanding of the impact of international law 
on local ownership of post-conflict reconstruction. The particular focus of the article is on 
popular influence over the decision to initiate international involvement that will at least 
enable, if not direct, the change and development of state and civil infrastructure. The 
international legal framework and practice under it are analysed from the perspective of two 
concurrent, but not entirely co-extensive, rationales for local ownership: a stable situation and 
self-determination of the people. Attention is given to a number of examples from the last 
twenty years, specifically, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Liberia, Iraq, and Somalia. A central argument is 
that the underdeveloped nature of the international legal framework for local ownership is 
important for the stability of post-conflict situations. In particular, the law of self-
determination is argued to be useful because it affords international actors a high level of 
discretion to determine when a request for their involvement is a sufficient reflection of the 
will of the people. However, it is also contended that the sustainability of this legal 
framework rests on international actors exercising their discretion responsibly. This entails 
refusing to initiate involvement on the basis of a request from a government with little claim 
to be an embodiment of the will of the people, unless there is strong contextual justification 
for such a course of action. 
Key words: local ownership, post-conflict, reconstruction, self-determination, will of the 
people, consent 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last twenty years, assistance from states and international organisations has been 
central to the reconstruction of state and civil infrastructure in a number of post-conflict 
situations. This assistance has been in the form of varying levels of military, financial, 
administrative and technical support. Examples of situations that are often discussed in the 
policy and legal literature on post-conflict reconstruction include, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Iraq.
1
 In each 
of these examples, political flux combined with extensive international engagement has made 
it more difficult for the will of the people to be reflected in the decision making on 
reconstruction, than in a functioning state situation.  
 
This article is concerned with local ownership of post-conflict reconstruction.
2
 The particular 
focus of the article is on two concurrent, but not entirely co-extensive, rationales for a pro-
active approach to local ownership. The first is to enhance the stability of the situation. If the 
people that are affected by a reconstruction process have a sense of ownership over crucial 
decisions, this will foster goodwill, rather than resistance, towards the outcomes.
3
  The 
second is to reduce inconsistency with the aspect of the political principle of self-
determination that posits that the people of a state as a whole should be free, within the 
boundaries of the state, to determine, without outside interference, their social, political, 
economic, and cultural infrastructure.
4
 This principle of self-determination remains central to 
international order, but it is contravened by the practice of post-conflict reconstruction that is 
dependent on international actors.
5
 From this perspective, local ownership initiatives operate 
to improve the connection between the reconstruction process and the will of the people, and 
thereby help to generate wider international acceptance and support for the practice.  
 
There is a clear overlap between these two rationales for local ownership of internationally 
facilitated post-conflict reconstruction. However, to improve consistency with the notion of 
self-determination, there is no inherent reason why efforts at local ownership should take the 
context into account. In contrast, if efforts at local ownership are not sensitive to contextual 
factors, such as the strength of a tentative peace, it is likely that they will reduce, rather than 
enhance, the stability of the post-conflict situation.
6
 It is important to highlight this difference 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., R Paris and TD Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations (Routledge, Oxford 2009); B. Bowden, H. Charlesworth, and J. Farrall (eds), The 
Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies after Conflict: Great Expectations (CUP, Cambridge 2009); J. 
Stromseth, D. Wippman, and R. Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military 
Interventions (CUP, Cambridge 2006).   
2
 Local ownership in the sense of popular participation and representation in decision making on the change and 
development of state and civil infrastructure or closely related matters, such as the initiation of international 
involvement. For a narrower approach to the definition of local ownership, one that limits it to the distinction 
between whether it is international actors or domestic actors that ultimately make the decisions, see E De 
Brandabere, Post-Conflict Administrations in International Law: International Territorial Administration, 
Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009) 277; 
for an approach to definition of local ownership that is more in line with the broad approach of this article, see 
B. Pouligny, ‗Local Ownership‘, in V. Chetail (ed.), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, (OUP, Oxford, 
2009) 174 – 187 at 174. 
3
 See A. S. Hansen, ‗From Intervention to Local Ownership: Rebuilding a Just and Sustainable Rule of Law 
after Conflict‘, in C. Stahn and J. K. Kleffner (eds.) Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from 
Conflict to Peace (T.M.C Asser Press, The Hague, 2008) 131 – 152 at 135. 
4
 J Waldron, ‗Two Conceptions of Self-Determination‘, in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds) The Philosophy of 
International Law (OUP, Oxford 2010) 397 -413 at 406.  
5
 See RD Caplan, ‗Transitional Administration‘, in Chetail (n 2) 359 - 367 at 364. 
6
 See e.g., T Donais, ‗Inclusion or Exclusion? Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform‘, (2009) 3(1) 
Studies in Social Justice Volume 117-131at 122; J  Narten, ‗Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: The Case 
of Postwar Kosovo‘, in Paris and Sisk (eds) (n 1) pp. 252-83; S Chesterman, ‗Ownership in Theory and 
Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations‘, (2007) 1 Journal of Intervention and 
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because the international legal framework for local ownership has only been informed by 
considerations of self-determination. Moreover, the legal right of all peoples to self-
determination and the associated right to political participation were formed well before the 
trend, following the end of the cold war, for large-scale intervention in post-conflict 
situations. Accordingly, there is good reason to be concerned that the law will have affected 
the ability of lead actors to tailor local ownership to suit the circumstances of a particular 
situation. At the same time, though, the law of self-determination remains underdeveloped 
and much debated in international law. This means that it should also not be assumed that the 
law ensures a meaningful connection between the reconstruction process and the will of the 
people. 
 
The difficulties that have been encountered by lead actors when trying to achieve some of the 
international legal standards related to political participation in post-conflict situations have 
been highlighted elsewhere.
7
 However, to date, little attention has been given to the wider 
issue about how, if at all, international law contributes to the achievement of the two 
highlighted rationales which underpin efforts towards greater local ownership.
8
 This is an 
important line of enquiry with regard to the inclusion of the views of the people in the 
decision making on change and development, but it is also pertinent with regard to the 
decision to initiate the large-scale international involvement that makes reconstruction 
possible. As a general matter, the latter aspect of local ownership has been overlooked in both 
the policy and the legal literature on post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, particularly events in 
Somalia in 2006/07 suggest that there is a pressing need for some closer consideration of the 
law directed at local ownership of the initiation of international involvement. In Somalia, 
Ethiopia‘s armed forces helped to place the Federal Transitional Government in control of 
parts of the state, in spite of little evidence that this coincided with the will of the people or 
signs that the context would be well served.
9
 
 
By examining the role of international law directed at local ownership of post-conflict 
reconstruction from the perspective of the stability of the post-conflict situation and the self-
determination of the people, this article seeks to help develop a clearer understanding of the 
law‘s significance. The analysis addresses the law and practice of local ownership of the 
initiation of international involvement, rather than matters related to the accommodation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Statebuilding  3–26; O Marenin, ‗Understanding Mission Environments: Local Contexts and the Legitimation of 
Reforms‘, (2010) 14 Journal of International Peacekeeping 223 – 247. 
7
 See e.g., M. Salamum, Democratic Governance in International Territorial Administration (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2005); L Carlowitz, ‗UNMIK Lawmaking between Effective Peace Support and Internal Self-
Determination‘, (2003) 41/3 Archiv des Völkerrechts 336; GH Fox, ‗International Law and the Entitlement to 
Democracy after War‘, (2003) 9 Global Governance 2179. 
8
 See, though, B Bowden and H Charlesworth ‗Defining Democracy in International Institutions‘, in Bowden, 
Charlesworth, and Farrall (eds) (n 1) 91, addressing how efforts at defining democracy in international 
institutions relate to the stability and progress of post-conflict situations; as well as M Cogen and E De 
Brabandere, ‗Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction‘, (2007) 20 LJIL 669 examining the 
role of international law on political participation in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq; see alsoT 
Mikkilineni, ‗The Regulation of Political Parties in Post-Conflict Societies,‘ (2009) I.I.L.J. Emerging Scholar 
Paper <http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/MikkilineniESP13-09.pdf> considering the appropriateness 
of the international regulatory framework for anti-democratic political parties in post-conflict situations.  
9
 See Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, UN Doc S/2007/115, 28 February 2007 para. 
5. 
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the views of the population in the subsequent decision making on change and development of 
the state and civil infrastructure.
10
 A central argument is that the underdeveloped nature of 
the international legal framework for local ownership is important for the stability of post-
conflict situations. In particular, the law of self-determination is argued to be useful because 
it affords international actors a high level of discretion to determine when a request for their 
involvement is a sufficient reflection of the will of the people. However, it is also contended 
that the sustainability of this legal framework rests on international actors exercising their 
discretion responsibly. This entails refusing to initiate involvement on the basis of a request 
from a government with little claim to be an embodiment of the will of the people, unless 
there is strong contextual justification for such a course of action. 
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that this article does not address in any detail the legal 
issues surrounding, or the role of, a UN Security Council chapter VII authorisation for 
international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction.
11
 It is, though, important to clarify 
the relationship between a chapter VII resolution and the legal right of all peoples to self-
determination. A chapter VII resolution can provide a legal justification for international 
engagement in post-conflict situations. The passage of such a resolution and its scope relates 
to the possibility of agreement amongst the members of the Security Council. More 
specifically, agreement that there is a threat to international peace and security and on the 
type of response that is necessary to address the threat.
12
 There has been extensive debate 
about the limits of the authority of the Council in international law.
13
 It is sufficient to note 
that the legitimacy, and therefore effectiveness, of Council resolutions is attached to 
consistency with international law, especially fundamental principles of international law 
such as the right to self-determination.
14
 This means that although the Council may be able to 
bypass, as a matter of international law, the requirements of the right to self-determination,
15
 
it is unlikely to be able to agree to do so, apart from perhaps where the threat to international 
peace and security is of a particularly extreme and pressing nature. Consequently, even where 
there has been a chapter VII authorisation for international involvement in a post-conflict 
situation, the right to self-determination can still be expected to have had some impact on the 
process surrounding the initiation of this involvement. 
 
                                                          
10
 It should also be stressed that the article does not consider the potential for conflict between two key 
principles of the United Nation‘s agenda for rule of law reconstruction in post-conflict situations: that 
reconstruction should be in line with international standards but at the same time locally owned, see S Vig, ‗The 
Conflictual Promises of the United Nations‘ Rule of Law Agenda: Challenges for Post-Conflict Societies‘, 
(2009) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping 131–158.   
11
 See J. Stromseth, D. Wippman, and R. Brooks (n 1) pp. 30-33; G Fox Humanitarian Occupation (CUP, 
Cambridge 2008) 200 – 217. 
12
 See U.N. Charter arts 39, 41, and 42; see also S Wheatley, ‗The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy, 
and Regime Change in Iraq‘, (2006) 17 EJIL 531 at 543. 
13
 See D Akande, ‗Are there Limits to the Powers of the Security Council?‘, (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Law and Policy 2. 
14
 ND White, ‗The Will and Authority of the Security Council after Iraq‘, (2004) 17 LJIL 645 at 672. 
15
 See MC Wood, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures 2006: The UN Security Council and International 
Law, Second Lecture, p. 9, para. 28, available at 
<http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/lectures/2006_sir_michael_wood.php>; Wheatley n. 12 at 541; M Matheson, 
‗United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies‘, 95 AJIL (2001) 76, at 85.   
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It is first useful to expand on the role of local ownership in the practice of post-conflict 
reconstruction. The intention here is not to extensively map the debate about the merits of 
different approaches to local ownership. Rather, the aim is to explain why the present 
international legal framework for local ownership of post-conflict reconstruction might be 
expected to struggle in terms of relevance. This discussion underpins the analysis of the 
international legal framework for local ownership of the initiation of international 
involvement, and practice under it, in subsequent sections. 
 
2. Stable Post-Conflict Situations, Self-Determination, and Jus Post Bellum 
 
Any government that purports to be a conclusive embodiment of the will of all the people 
within a territory must be treated with suspicion. Most fundamentally, this is because the will 
of the people is an abstract concept, there is no monolithic thought pattern to which all the 
people adhere. It is also because decisions will inevitably be taken on the basis of political 
expedience rather than what is wanted by or is rationally in the best interests of the state and 
its people.
16
 Nonetheless, governments that are able to maintain public order without resort to 
the threat of force must come closer to realising the will of the people than dictators reliant on 
force. This is because the compliance of the people entails an implication that they want the 
government to determine the future of the state on their behalf.
17
 Moreover, the implication 
that an effective government has a legitimate claim to be an embodiment of the will of the 
people is enhanced if the government forms part of a political system in which the population 
are able – through voting, for instance  – to have a bearing on the ability of the government to 
continue in authority.
18
 The post-conflict setting complicates matters. 
 
No standard definition of a post-conflict situation exists. This article proceeds on the basis 
that, although in most situations there will not be a clear demarcation between conflict and 
post-conflict,
19
 post-conflict is somewhere in-between conflict and peace. And that post-
conflict entails circumstances of political flux which will make it difficult to identify a 
government with a legitimate claim to represent the views of the people. Indeed, efforts at 
reconstruction are likely to be necessary before a viable political entity with a legitimate 
claim to be an embodiment of the will of the people can be identified.
20
 This has 
consequences for the extent to which it is ever going to be possible for a reconstruction 
process in the aftermath of war to reflect the will of the people. In particular, it means it can 
be difficult to connect a request for international engagement to the will of the people; and 
                                                          
16
 The Trustees of the Late Duke of Westminster‘s Estate v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 440 at 546. 
17
 See BR Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) at 137-142 
and 419; D Wippman, ‗Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?‘, (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law 
Review 607 at  612. 
18
 See I. Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2003) exploring the 
view ‗that a central task for democracy is to enable people to manage power relations so as to minimise 
domination‘ p.3.  
19
 G. Verdirame, ‗Human Rights Protection by the UN in Post-Conflict Situations: Accountability‘, in ND 
White and D Klaasen (eds) The UN, Human Rights, and Post-Conflict Situations (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester 2005) 81 -97 at p. 83 
20
 M. Evans, ‗Balancing Peace, Justice and Sovereignty in Jus Post Bellum: The Case of ―Just Occupation‖‘, 
(2008) 36 Journal of International Studies 542 at 549. 
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then that it can be difficult for the views of the people to be included in the decision making 
on reconstruction which the international involvement facilitates.  
 
The distance between decision making and the will of the people is readily apparent where 
the reconstruction is by direct international governance. This was the case in Kosovo and 
East Timor.
21
 However, extra distance is also present where a domestic government is 
completely dependent on international actors. This has been the case in places like Haiti, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan.
22
 In such circumstances, the fact that a government‘s 
authority is dependent on the international assistance might lead it – without the usual 
incentive to retain the favour of the people – to concentrate on its own political and economic 
interests rather than those of the people.
23
 Alternatively, the government might feel pressure, 
explicit or implicit, to prioritise the preferences of the international actors that make the 
reconstruction process possible.
24
 Still, international involvement in post-conflict situations 
can be seen as central to the preservation of public order and the possibility of reconstruction 
in the post-conflict setting.
25
 Accordingly, there is a basis for querying why it is even 
necessary to attempt to improve local ownership.
26
 
 
A. Two Rationales for Local Ownership 
 
One technique to achieve greater local ownership is through a pro-active approach to popular 
participation in politics once the internationally dependent governance arrangement is in 
place. To date, this has tended to be the focus of the policy debate on best practice 
proposals.
27
 However, no matter how much effort is made to accommodate the views of the 
people in the internationally facilitated reconstruction, the very fact of dependence on 
international actors will prevent, for the reasons set out above, the governance conditions of a 
functioning state being replicated. Such a reality increases the importance of another 
dimension of local ownership: linking the initiation of international involvement to the will of 
                                                          
21
 See D. Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention (Pluto Press, London 
2002)  204; D Zaum, The Sovereignty Paardox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding OUP, 
Oxford, 2007) at 27 and 136; for a detailed comparison between recent instances of direct international 
governance of post-conflict territories and the traditional international law concept of trusteeship, see R Wilde, 
International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilising Mission Never Went Away (OUP, 
Oxford, 2008).    
22
 See M Saul, ‗From Haiti to Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State Reconstruction in 
International Law‘, (2009) 11 International Community Law Review 119 – 148; see also L. Andersen, 
‗Outsiders Inside the State. Post Conflict Liberia between Trusteeship and Partnership‘, (2010) 4 Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 129 – 152. 
23
 M. Barnett and C. Zurcher, ‗The Peacebuilder‘s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak 
Statehood‘, in R Paris and TD Sisk (eds), (n 1) 23 – 52 at pp. 31 – 35. 
24
 Barnett and Zurcher, (n 23). 
25
 See J. Stromseth, D. Wippman, and R. Brooks (n 1) pp. 134 -177. 
26
 See also A Orford, ‗Book Review Article: International Administration and the Management of 
Decolonisation‘, (2010) 59 ICLQ 227 – 249 at 248. 
27
 See, e.g., T Pietz and L von Carlowitz, ‗Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States‘, 
(Report of Expert Meeting, April 2007), ZIF Report 12/07, available at <http://www.zif-
berlin.org/en/projekte/local-ownership-project.html> (accessed 23 July 2010); De Brandabere (n 2) 
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the people. This article focuses on two rationales for efforts to improve this aspect of local 
ownership.  
 
(i) Stable post-conflict situations 
 
It is generally accepted that where the people of a post-conflict situation feel they have 
ownership of the reconstruction process, this will help to foster goodwill, rather than 
resistance, towards the outcomes.
28
 Accordingly, any initiatives that seek to enhance local 
ownership have the potential to have a positive impact on the stability of the post-conflict 
situation, as they will increase support for the reconstruction process amongst the population. 
The decision to initiate international involvement is no exception to this idea. In fact, the 
more the population are involved in identifying what is required in terms of external 
assistance, the less likely they are to be concerned by the inevitable distance between their 
views and the decisions that are subsequently taken on reconstruction by an internationally 
facilitated administration.   
 
Still, an important point to stress is that the stability of the post-conflict setting is best served 
by the efforts at local ownership being tailored to the context.
29 
More direct consultation with 
the population,
 30
 or more effort to identify a government with a meaningful claim to be an 
embodiment of the will of the people, could both help to bring the decision to initiate 
international involvement closer to the will of the people. Nevertheless, if these efforts are 
not implemented with sensitivity to contextual factors – such as the cause of the conflict, 
strength of the peace, size of the territory, ethnic makeup of the population, and the level to 
which state and civil infrastructure have been devastated –31 there is the possibility that 
overall they will have a detrimental, rather than beneficial, effect on the volatility of the 
situation. For instance, greater levels of popular consultation could delay the initiation of 
international involvement deemed necessary to secure a tentative arrangement for peace. 
                                                          
28
 See, e.g., Hansen (n 3) at 135. 
29
 See work cited above at (n 6); on the importance of context for the approach taken to the actual decisions on 
change and development of state and civil infrastructure in post-conflict situation, see B Hughes and C Hunt, 
‗The Rule of Law in Peace and Capacity Building Operations: Moving beyond a Conventional 
State-Centred Imagination‘, (2009) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping 267 – 293; A Ghani and C 
Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (OUP, Oxford 2008) 169; UN 
Doc S/2004/616, ‗The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies‘ p. 6; with 
regard to the implications of context for the creation of a legal blueprint for reconstruction see C Stahn, ‗Jus 
Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)‘, in Stahn and JK Kleffner (n 3) 93-11 at 108; see also N Bhuta, ‗New 
Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of Constitutional Transformation‘, (2010)  60 
University of Toronto Law Journal 799-854 at 849; on the potential relevance of context for criminal justice in 
post-conflict situations, see R Cryer ‗Post-Conflict Accountability: a Matter of Judgement Practice or Principle‘, 
in White and Klassen (n 19) 267 -289 at 269.  
30
 On consultation as one of a number of possible approaches for enhancing the proximity of decision making on 
reconstruction by an international administration, see C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International 
Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 717 – 729; Salamum (n 7) 
181-187; De Brandabere (n 2) 300.  
31
 For consideration of the relative importance of different factors in post-conflict settings, see, in particular, 
Marenin (n 6); also R Wedgwood and HK Jacobson, ‗State Reconstruction after Civil Conflict: Symposium 
(Foreword)‘, (2001) 95 AJIL 1 -6.  
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(ii) Self-determination 
 
The second rationale for local ownership stems from the current condition of international 
society. The nature of the state system has progressed from a time when it was accurate to 
conceive of international society as purely ‗an association of independent and diverse 
political communities, each devoted to its own ends and its own conception of the good‘.32 
Currently, states have more values in common, than ever before. And a common concern for 
matters such as security and human rights helps to explain: ‗the move to institutions and 
expansion of global rule making; changes in the making, development, and justification of 
international law; the increasing emphasis placed on the enforcement of international norms 
and rules; and a changed understanding of the state and sovereignty.‘33 Still, the depth of 
agreement on shared values is variable, and many topics, such as when and how it is 
appropriate to intervene in the affairs of another state, remain divisive. This underpins why, 
in spite of an increased solidarity amongst states, the aspect of the principle of self-
determination that posits that the people of a state as a whole should be free, within the 
boundaries of the state, to determine, without outside interference, their social, political, 
economic, and cultural infrastructure, continues to be central to the preservation of 
international order.
34
 Accordingly, one can appreciate Hurrell‘s argument that ‗[t]he global 
political order remains heavily structured around inherited pluralist mechanisms that are, by 
any standards, deficient and deformed, certainly when measured by the values which 
international society aspires but very often even by the more minimalist goals and values of 
the earlier period.‘35 The issue of whether and how international actors should engage in post-
conflict situations brings the difficulties that surround an international society consisting of 
both solidarist and pluralist elements into focus. 
 
In post-conflict situations, the absence of a domestic government that can sustain public order 
is problematic from the perspective of the realisation of human rights, as the state will not be 
able to meet the needs of the population.
36
 The lack of effective governance also creates 
                                                          
32
 T Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1983) p 9, 
cited by A Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (OUP, 
Oxford, 2007) p 298. 
33
 Hurrell (n 32) 58 and 59. 
34
 J Waldron, ‗Two Conceptions of Self-Determination‘, in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds) The Philosophy of 
International Law (OUP, Oxford 2010) 397 -413 at 406; see also Hurrell (32) 28 and 177; BR Roth, ‗The 
Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty‘, (2004) 56 Florida Law Review p. 1017 at 1038 and 1042; it should 
be noted that this reference to international order is meant more in the traditional sense, with order, as described 
by R Foot, ‗Introduction‘, in R Foot, JL Gaddis, and A Hurrell (eds) Order and Justice in International 
Relations (OUP, Oxford, 2003) 1 – 23 at 3, ‗based on the protection of societal difference and of values 
associated with the state system.‘; this is in contrast to more expansive conceptions which seek to give 
precedence to the interests of non-state actors, particularly individuals, see, for instance, R McCourqodale, 
‗International Community and State Sovereignty: An Uneasy Symbiotic Relationship‘, in C Warbrick and S 
Tierney (eds) Towards an International Legal Community: The Sovereignty of States and the Sovereignty of 
International Law (BIICL, London, 2006) 241 - 265. 
35
 A Hurrell, ‗Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?‘, in Foot, Gaddis, and Hurrell (n 
34) 24 – 48 at 48. 
36
 See G Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004) p. 87. 
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problems for international security, for example, terrorist training camps might be established 
or any disorder might spread to bordering territories.
37
 Consequently, for a solidarist 
international society committed to international security and human rights, there is an 
imperative for international engagement in post-conflict situations to help restore long-term, 
effective, and peaceful domestic governance. However, the level of international involvement 
that is necessary to make a significant difference is likely to conflict with the principle of 
self-determination,
 38
 which is central to a pluralist understanding of international society. 
Ultimately, then, in terms of generating international support and acceptance for large-scale 
international engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, the solidarist vision of international 
society is competing with the pluralist conception.  
 
Evidence of this can be found in a debate on the role of the UN in post-conflict reconciliation. 
Although all participating states identified ways in which the UN could contribute, there was 
a range in the levels of direct engagement and influence that the various states identified. For 
instance, Germany highlighted that on occasion there would need to be an extensive UN 
contribution, which would likely include some or all of the following:  
 
‗the creation of tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions, assistance in 
organizing and holding free and fair elections, assistance in drawing up a new, 
integrative constitution, joint demilitarization and demining, as well as the complete 
range of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for 
excombatants of former civil war enemies, and the mobilization of international 
financial and technical assistance for post-conflict economic and social reconstruction 
plans.‘39  
 
Germany also stressed that where there is a lack of political will from local decision makers,  
‗it may be one of the most delicate and challenging tasks for the United Nations to inspire 
among local policy-makers and conflict-torn populations the confidence necessary to make 
the policy choices that hold the promise of a just and more prosperous future. Indeed, the 
United Nations has a unique legitimacy to do so.‘40 In contrast, the Chinese statement 
emphasised that, even when it is the United Nations that is taking action, ‗[n]othing should be 
imposed upon them [the local decision makers].‘41 It is here that local ownership has another 
important role.  
 
More specifically, efforts at local ownership can be seen as a means of encouraging states 
with a more pluralist outlook to accept internationally facilitated post-conflict reconstruction 
                                                          
37
 See UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), p. 25. 
38
 See Caplan (n 5); also ‗Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination‘, UN Doc GA 
Res. 58/161, 22 Dec. 2003, at para. 2; Wheatley (n 12) 540.  
39
 UN Doc. S/PV 4903, 26 January 2004, ‗Post-conflict national reconciliation: role of the United Nations‘, at  
12 – 13. 
40
 (n 39) 
41
 (n 39) at 29. 
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processes. This is because by bringing internationally facilitated post-conflict reconstruction 
closer to the will of the people, local ownership initiatives reduce the extent of the neglect of 
the principle of self-determination.
42
 Consequently, local ownership is a means of not only 
increasing the provisions of resources for the reconstruction process, but also reducing the 
prospect of obstructive behaviour, such as the blocking of vital Security Council resolutions. 
 
It should also be noted that, in contrast to the rationale of a stable post-conflict situation, in 
order to improve consistency with the political principle of self-determination, there is no 
inherent reason why efforts at local ownership should take account of the context. For 
instance, regardless of the volatility of a situation, more consultation with the people will still 
improve the consistency of the decision to initiate international involvement with the 
principle of self-determination. Still, in terms of galvanising international acceptance and 
support, there are likely to be some situations where wider international opinion will be less 
concerned about self-determination, than others. That is, it is reasonable to expect the 
importance of consistency with self-determination for generating international support to be 
in inverse correlation with the magnitude of the threat to international security and human 
rights.  
 
B.  A Useful Role for International Legal Regulation of Local Ownership? 
 
In the light of the persuasiveness of these two rationales for improving local ownership, it is 
rational to consider why there would be a need for international legal regulation. There are a 
number of ways that international legal regulation might make a useful contribution. For 
instance, international legal regulation could provide a basis for responding to an abuse of 
authority, such as a complete lack of concern for the will of the people by the lead actors. 
Legal regulation could also be expected to incentivise efforts to identity popular opinion. 
Moreover, the existence of a legal framework could offer some reassurance to the population 
that the decisions related to the initiation of international involvement would be made 
responsibly.
43
 Still, the relationship between the nature of the context and the usefulness of 
efforts at local ownership for the stability of the situation provides a reason to be concerned 
that legal regulation might also create complications.  
 
The importance of context would not remove the scope for international legal regulation to 
make a useful contribution to local ownership from the perspective of the stability of a post-
                                                          
42
 This idea finds support in the work of moral theorists who have addressed the normative tension surrounding 
post-conflict situations. The tension is a reference to the importance of political stability – which international 
involvement can help bring to a situation – conflicting with the importance of respect for the autonomy of the 
political community – which is restricted by international involvement. Local ownership is a common feature of 
the recommendations for reducing the tension. See, e.g., S Recchia, ‗Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: 
How Much External Interference Can Be Justified?‘, 2009 Ethics and International Affairs 165 – 187 at 183; B 
Orend, ‗Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist‘, (2007) 20 LJIL 571 at 588 – 589.  
43
 See also ND White, ‗Peace Operations‘, in Chetail (n 2) 213 – 227 at p 225 highlighting the importance for 
the legitimacy of peace operations that the international component is not seen by the affected population as 
above the law. 
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conflict situation. However, a process along the lines of that proposed by Österdahl and van 
Zandel for the crafting of legal regulation for all aspects of the post-conflict situation, to serve 
the purpose of a just and durable peace, would appear wise.
44
 Their idea is for agreement to 
be reached on aspects of post-conflict situations that require legal regulation from which no-
derogation is permitted, as well as on those aspects that could benefit from a more selective 
approach to legal regulation.
45
 Even if just one aspect of the post-conflict environment was 
focused on, this would be a demanding project.
46
 But potentially more problematic than 
motivating states to partake in the drafting process, would be the creation of a legal 
framework for local ownership that could be seen as appropriate for the stability of a situation 
and also provide a minimum level of self-determination for the people. The problem here 
stems from the fact that it is conceivable that in particular situations stability will be best 
served, for a time at least, with absolutely no local ownership.
47
  
 
It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to propose a new legal framework that balances 
concern for the stability of the situation with the principle of self-determination. Rather this 
article is interested in the suitability of the existing legal framework for local ownership of 
the initiation of international involvement, which strikingly has not been crafted with the 
post-conflict setting in mind. In fact, this framework is centred on the legal right to self-
determination, which emerged in the 1960s in the period of decolonisation, and reflects the 
importance of the political principle of self-determination for the international society of 
states.  
 
The fact that the law of self-determination was formed before the examples of large-scale 
international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction over the last twenty years is far from 
encouraging, in terms of it making a useful contribution. Certainly, concern is reasonable 
with regard to the potential for the law to have affected the stability of post-conflict 
situations. In particular, there is reason to be concerned that the law may overly limit the 
freedom of international actors to take contextual factors into account, when determining 
whether they have sufficient evidence of what sort of external support, if any, the people 
desire. However, in light of the level of debate and disagreements that continue to surround 
the meaning of the international legal concept of self-determination,
48
 it should also not be 
assumed that the legal framework ensures a meaningful level of self-determination for the 
people within a post-conflict territory. 
 
                                                          
44
 I Österdahl and E van Zandel, ‗What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles‘, (2009) 14 
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 Österdahl and E van Zandel (n 44) p18. 
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 See Orend (n 42) 591. 
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 See Chesterman (n 6) 
48
 See M Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008) 22-29; A Orford, 
Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2003) 127; G. Simpson, ‗The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post – Colonial 
Age‘, 32 Stan. JIL (1996) pp. 257–58; H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The 
Accommodation Of Conflict Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1990) 27. 
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3. The Legal Framework for Local Ownership of the Initiation of International 
Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
 
The foregoing has shown that there is some scope for an international legal standard for local 
ownership of the initiation of international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction to be 
useful. However, it is also apparent that the need to accommodate two concurrent, but not 
entirely coextensive, rationales in the same legal framework complicates matters. On the one 
hand, if the legal standard is too demanding with regard to evidence of the will of the people, 
it can be expected to hinder the scope for the sort of international engagement in post-conflict 
reconstruction that can appear central to the stability of a situation. On the other hand, if the 
law does not set requirements in terms of evidence of the will of the people, there might be a 
lack of effort, which would represent a disregard for the principle of self-determination and, 
as a consequence, lead to a reduction in the level of wider international acceptance of the 
practice.  
 
This section considers the existing substantive law of self-determination and the associated 
mechanisms for accountability. A core concern is the relevance of this legal framework for 
both a stable situation and the preservation of meaning in the notion of self-determination of 
the people that is at stake. It is first necessary to clarify the meaning of the legal right to self-
determination, its link with the political principle of self-determination, and its relationship 
with the other legal bar to large-scale international involvement in post-conflict 
reconstruction, state sovereignty. 
 
A. The Legal Right of all Peoples to Self-Determination and State Sovereignty 
 
The commitment of the international society of states to the self-determination of all peoples 
was demonstrated with the signing of the UN Charter in 1945. Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter 
states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to pursue the development of friendly 
relations among nations ‗based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.‘ The UN Charter lacks elaboration on the intended meaning of self-
determination. Its inclusion has been explained as a means of promoting genuine self-
government for all peoples,
49
 but at this point in history there was not a legal right to self-
determination. The development of the legal right to self-determination has occurred 
subsequent to the signing of the UN Charter, through a number of General Assembly 
Resolutions and its inclusion as Common Article 1 in the two International Covenants of 
Human Rights.
50
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 See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
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50
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The backdrop to the crystallisation of the legal right to self-determination was the movement 
for decolonisation during the 1960s.
51
 This helps to explain why, in spite of self-
determination as a political principle having a number of different dimensions, the core 
meaning of the legal right to self-determination centres on the idea of freedom from 
subjugation. More specifically, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence (1960) 
states that ‗the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.‘ 
And provides that ‗all peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of their right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.‘ This is the basis for a people subject to colonial rule to be given the 
choice of how they wish to be constituted: independence, integration, or association.
52
  
 
It is now readily accepted that the legal right to self-determination also applies beyond the 
colonial context.
53
 However, the broad formulation of ‗all peoples have the right freely to 
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development‘, which is repeated in almost all the relevant UN documents, 
underpins why its meaning has been and continues to be the source of considerable 
contestation.
54
 Given the various layers of meaning that it is possible to extract from the 
common formulation of the right to self-determination, it is important to clarify the sense in 
which the legal right to self-determination is understood for the purposes of this article. In 
this respect, a useful approach involves contrasting self-determination as a political principle 
with its status in international law. 
 
As a political principle, self-determination has at least three key dimensions. One is that the 
people of a state as a whole should be free, within the boundaries of the state, to determine, 
without outside interference, their social, political, economic, and cultural infrastructure.
55
 
Another is focused on each ethnically or culturally distinct group, being free to choose how it 
constitutes itself.
56
 And a third is that a state should be constituted along democratic lines to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
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282 at 254-255. 
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54
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56
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enable the people to participate in the state‘s social, political, economic, and cultural 
systems.
57
  
 
Attempts have been made, with varying levels of success, to identify each of these 
dimensions within the international legal concept of self-determination. The second 
dimension, on particular groups, is a potential challenge to the territorial integrity of existing 
states and the stability of the international system. This underpins why, although it is often 
invoked by liberation groups that seek to align their cause with peoples that are subject to 
colonial rule, it has received little support amongst states, at least in the sense of a right to 
secession for such groups.
58
 The democratic dimension has been more successful in gaining 
the support of states and scholars,
59
 but it is still, arguably, some way off being an accepted 
point of law.
60
 This is not least because of the definitional difficulties that surround the debate 
about democracy as an international legal concept.
61
 By far the most successful, in terms of 
the recognition by states of its international legal status, has been the first dimension. Thus 
not only is it deemed politically important but it is also an international legal requirement that 
the population of a state as a whole be free to ‗determine, without external interference, their 
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development‘.62 The exact 
point at which the level of international influence over the internal affairs of a state would 
contravene this aspect of legal right to self-determination is difficult to ascertain. It is 
                                                          
57
 See, on President Wilson‘s conception of the principle self-determination, which is often referred to in 
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sufficient to note that any circumstance in which governance was completely dependent on 
international actors would violate the right to self-determination;
63
 this is subject to there 
being no valid consent for the international efforts (a point returned to below).  
 
The willingness of states to embrace this dimension of self-determination as part of 
international law can be explained by the ethical reinforcement it provides for the traditional 
legal structures for order amongst a pluralist international society of states, which are founded 
on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of other states.
64
 In this 
respect, it is important to highlight that the right to self-determination has an obvious overlap 
with the international legal concept of sovereignty. Specifically, under international law, a 
state has its own right to ‗freely choose and develop its political, social, economic and 
cultural systems‘.65 This overlap is support for the idea of popular sovereignty.66 Popular 
sovereignty is the idea that sovereignty is now better seen as the consummation of the self-
determination of people, rather than something that is worth protecting for its own sake. Yet, 
in spite of a long history of governments subscribing to the concept of popular sovereignty,
67
 
popular sovereignty has yet to be fully reflected in international law, which continues to 
separate out the rights of the state form the rights of the people.
68
 Thus there are two 
international legal concepts which serve to prohibit large-scale international engagement in 
post-conflict reconstruction.
69
  
 
Crucially, neither the legal right to self-determination nor the international legal concept of 
sovereignty is absolute. It is an inherent feature of sovereignty as an international legal 
concept that the exercise of sovereign rights can be contracted out.
70
 That is, while the state 
has the right to decide on its infrastructure, it is consistent with sovereignty for the state to 
invite an external actor to exercise aspects of this right. This is reflected in the fact that state 
consent can serve as a legal justification for otherwise wrongful activity in international 
law;
71
 particularly when the lack of consent is seen as central to the definition of wrongful 
intervention in international law.
72
 The same logic applies with the right of the people to self-
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determination. The people have the right to decide on the infrastructure, but if the people 
want an internationally enabled governance situation, even one without any room for 
domestic input, a request from the people renders such a situation consistent with the legal 
right to self-determination.
73
 In this respect, it is useful to note that, leaving aside a UN 
Security Council chapter VII authorisation, direct international administration of a state 
without a consensual basis would, to a very large extent, be precluded by the law of 
occupation from introducing any significant changes to the state and civil infrastructure.
74
 
Here, the law of occupation can be seen as a source of protection for the people‘s right to 
self-determination in adverse conditions.
75
 If there was valid consent for international 
administration, the law of occupation would not apply; instead the capacity to introduce 
change would be determined by the terms of the consent. More significant, for present 
purposes, is the question of what connection the source of consent must have to the will of 
the people for the consent to render international involvement consistent as matter of 
international law with the legal right to self-determination and sovereignty.  
 
B. A Request from the People for International Involvement? 
 
The will of the people is an abstract concept. As such, if the right to self-determination is to 
be exercised, in the sense of inviting international involvement in the change and 
development of state and civil infrastructure, there is a need for an agent, a government. 
Certain indicators can support a government‘s claim to be an embodiment of the will of the 
people. In particular, as was noted above, the ability to control the territory without resort to 
the threat of force and a democratic form would be useful signs that the people want a 
government to exercise their rights.  
 
A number of approaches have been taken to the argument that the legal right to self-
determination requires a democratic form of government.
76
 For instance, it has been argued 
that the right to self-determination found in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) should be read in conjunction with Article 25 the right to 
political participation, so that the right to self-determination is also breached if a government 
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does not satisfy Article 25.
77
 This argument finds some support in the Human Rights 
Committee‘s (HRC) General Comment on Article 25,78 but this is in the sense that the two 
rights are closely associated rather than one and the same, and there is also a lack of explicit 
support in the text of the ICCPR or the travaux preparatoires.
79
 More attention has been 
given to the meaning of the phrase ‗possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour‘, which is found in 
the account of self-determination in the Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations, GA Res. 2625, 1970. The concept of representative here is 
ambiguous. As such, it could be interpreted as a requirement for a democratic form of 
government.
80
 However, from the debate at the time of its adoption it is clear that this was at 
least not the intention of all parties, and subsequent practice also does not support the 
interpretation of representative as synonymous with democratic.
81
 Accordingly, as a matter of 
international law, it is left to the entity with governmental status to represent the will of the 
people of the state for the purpose of the exercise of their right to self-determination as well 
as the will of the state for the exercise of its sovereign rights.
82
 
 
In most cases, the government of a state will have independent effective control of the 
territory. Control is dependent on the compliance of the people, coerced or not. And the 
deference of a people to a government offers a basis for presuming that the people want it as 
their representative, however detached from reality this might be.
83
 Where the government 
does not have independent effective control, provided it has not been lost as a result of 
external intervention, then the grounds for this presumption are extinguished. This can clearly 
be the case in post-conflict situations. Therefore it might be assumed that, in such 
circumstances, there would be no possibility of the legal right to self-determination being 
satisfied. That is, there would be no agent that could provide valid consent. However, as is 
now turned to, it is possible for the basis for governmental status to be detached from control 
of territory.
84
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As the ICJ has noted: ‗[a]ccording to international law, there is no doubt that every Head of 
State is presumed to be able to act on behalf of the State in its international relations (see for 
example the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 7, para. 2 (a))‘.85 There is no 
mention of effective control here or in the noted provision of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, but, of course, the period of political flux in the aftermath of war might 
entail that there is no longer a head of state or that there are competing claims to be the head 
of state. In such circumstances, international law is hardly helpful. The traditional position is 
to allocate governmental competence on the basis of effective control: understood as the 
ability to maintain public order on the territory.
86
 Noticeably, one of the faults of the effective 
control test is the fact that it is a relative test, ‗effective enough‘.87 This means that provided a 
government has a modicum of independent effective control of the post-conflict state, there is 
a basis for it to retain or claim the credentials to be treated as the agent of the state and its 
people.  However, given the likelihood of a complete lack of control in a post-conflict 
situation, this test might still be of little utility. 
 
Alternatively, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, might be seen 
as a challenge to the effective control approach to governmental status, as it provides that: 
‗the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent voting procedures.‘ There are, though, a 
number of reasons why this provision is not as significant as it might at first appear. In 
particular, the document was of a political rather than a legal nature and a number of states 
chose to abstain.
88
 Still, there is another, more persuasive, explanation for why it may be 
possible to source of valid consent for international involvement in post-conflict situations: 
international recognition. 
 
Recognition of governmental status by other states, or more accurately other governments, is 
commonly seen as declaratory, rather than constitutive, of governmental status.
89
 However, 
even with the declaratory view, international recognition still serves as evidence of status. 
Consequently, it can help to bolster the claim of a government with only a splattering of 
control of the territory. Or, to all intents and purposes, establish the status of a government 
that has never enjoyed independent effective control.
90
 It can also operate in the opposite 
direction to block the status of an entity that has some degree of effective control over the 
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territory.
91
 Some states have a policy not to offer explicit recognition of governments, seeing 
it as interference in the internal affairs of a state.
92
 Nonetheless, such states have still been 
willing to use recognition where it suits their interests.
93
 Moreover, the significance of 
adopting a policy of not offering explicit recognition is further mitigated by the fact that, as 
far as governmental status is concerned, international relations serve a similar role.
94
 
 
A key factor explaining international recognition of struggling governments has been their 
democratic credentials.
95
 However, it remains that international recognition is not limited by 
any criteria for democracy.
96
 For instance, non-democratic governments continue to be 
recognised,
97
 and it has been the case that a fledgling government will secure recognition 
merely through the promise to hold elections in the future.
98
 This means that it is possible for 
states to disagree and, consequently, for international opinion to be split on whether an entity 
has governmental status.
99
 Most pressingly, for present purposes, it also entails that there is 
scope for a government with very little claim to be an embodiment of the will of the people to 
be granted the international legal capacity to initiate large-scale international involvement in 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
In this respect, it is important to highlight that there has been debate about whether consent to 
military intervention from ineffective but internationally recognised governments is valid 
under international law. The case for such law has a strong conceptual logic: identity of the 
agent for the rights of the state and its people is uncertain so international actors should not 
be permitted under international law to become involved with activity that affects these 
rights.
100
 The rule‘s existence has been contemplated for the civil war context,101 as well as 
for when control has never existed or has been lost without a direct assault on the authority of 
the government.
102
 However, the strength of the rule has always struggled in the civil war 
context. This is primarily because of the ease by which those accused of violating it can claim 
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there had already been external assistance for the other side that can justify further 
involvement on the basis of collective self-defence.
103
 Moreover, a recent study by the 
Institut De Droit International found that there is also little evidence for such a rule away 
from the civil war context.
104
 In sum, this debate highlights a possible basis for a challenge to 
the legal capacity of an ineffective but internationally recognised post-conflict government to 
provide consent to an international military presence intended to keep it in authority. The 
debate also reveals, however, that presently the legal grounds for such a challenge remain 
doubtful. 
 
It is apparent, then, that it is possible for the initiation of large-scale international 
involvement in post-conflict situations to be reconciled with the right to self-determination as 
a matter of international law. This requires a valid consensual basis. It is also evident, though, 
that satisfying this legal requirement of self-determination might contribute little in terms of 
meaningful local ownership of the decision. This is because it is possible for governmental 
status to rest on little more than international recognition, and international recognition is not 
limited by specific criteria directed at assessing the claim of a government to be an 
embodiment of the will of its citizens.
105
 One consequence of the present condition of the 
substantive law in this area is that it should not be assumed that consistency with the law will 
be treated by wider international society as a sufficient attempt at reconciling the involvement 
in post-conflict situations with the underlying political principle of self-determination. 
Another consequence is that the potential for the law to contribute to the stability of the 
situation, in the sense of encouraging appropriate efforts with regard to local ownership of the 
decision to initiate external engagement, has hardly been utilised. In the light of these doubts 
about the relevance of the law for both the rationales that were highlighted in Section 2 
above, it is reasonable to consider why international actors would, nonetheless, seek to 
comply with the legal right to self-determination.  
 
C. The Legal Right to Self-Determination and Mechanisms for Accountability 
 
The above discussion has highlighted that valid consent for international involvement in post-
conflict situations is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of the true will of the people. However, 
this does not mean that it will have no bearing on the level of wider international acceptance 
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of large-scale international involvement in a post-conflict situation.
106
 The reason for this can 
be traced back to the idea of international society, which was highlighted above, as 
increasingly solidarist but still rooted to its pluralist foundations. 
 
More specifically, an insistence on valid consent can be seen as way of mediating between 
these two competing conceptions of international society. On the one hand, the fact that it is 
still possible to source valid consent in the aftermath of war ensures that it remains possible 
for a practice that might be deemed central to solidarist interests of security and human rights 
to proceed. On the other hand, the fact that consent is required and that some effort will be 
necessary to source consent, can help to reduce the impression that, in condoning the 
practice, the wider international society of states is endorsing a lessening in the importance of 
the principle of self-determination as a general matter. In favour of this conception of the role 
of consent, is the long standing preference of certain members of the UN Security Council for 
there to be consent from a target state before they will agree to pass a chapter VII resolution 
authorising the deployment of a military presence, even though such consent may be of little 
more than nominal value.
107
 For present purposes, the key point is that, if international actors 
want to maximise the level of support they receive for their involvement in a post-conflict 
situation, it is of central importance that consent that will satisfy the legal right to self-
determination is obtained. What about prospective interveners that are less concerned with 
wider international acceptance, can they also be expected to attempt to satisfy the legal right 
to self-determination before commencing involvement in a post-conflict situation? 
 
Here, the scope for lawful direct action to be taken in response would be important, and, in 
this respect, the secondary rules on state responsibility found in the International Law 
Commission‘s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility are particularly notable.108 The ILC 
Articles, in Part 2 Chapter III, set out some of the consequences that follow from serious 
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. Chapter III 
covers law that prohibits conduct which is considered to present a challenge ‗to the survival 
of states and their peoples and the most basic human values.‘109 The identification of law 
which has the requisite peremptory status remains the source of considerable debate.
110
 A 
strong, but certainly not conclusive, indicator that the legal right to self-determination does 
have this status is found in its inclusion as an example of such a norm in the ILC‘s 
Commentaries on Chapter III.
111
 This provides a basis for arguing that where there is a 
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serious breach, defined as a ‗gross or systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfil the 
obligation‘ (Article 40), states are under a positive duty to co-operate to bring to an end 
through lawful means the breach and are also not obliged to recognise the situation (Article 
41). There is a lack of clarity about the manner and extent to which the law would have to be 
breached to entail ‗serious‘,112 as well as whether there presently exists a positive obligation 
to act.
113
 The point, though, is that, in contrast with most other aspects of international law, 
there would be, at the very least, a strong moral imperative for all members of the 
international society of states to take action to bring an infringement of the right to self-
determination to an end. 
 
In terms of the steps that could be taken under international law to bring a violation of the 
right to self-determination to an end, the ILC Articles indicate in Article 48 that for an 
obligation that is owed to the international community as a whole, such as the right to self-
determination,
114
 there is scope for any state invoking responsibility and calling for reparation 
for the injured party. The lawfulness of coercive countermeasures to ensure compliance is 
much more uncertain in relation to human rights instruments and obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole, than other multilateral instruments where states can be 
directly injured (e.g, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961). This is reflected in 
the fact that Article 54, for when a state is not directly injured, refers only to lawful, rather 
than the more open approach in Article 49 which refers simply to countermeasures.
115
 
However, this has not stopped states taking, and international toleration of coercive 
countermeasures in extreme situations of human rights violations.
116
  
 
International actors interested in involvement in post-conflict situations are unlikely to want 
to risk direct coercive measures being taken under the law of state responsibility. However, 
they are perhaps more likely to be deterred from abandoning the law of self-determination by 
the prospect of action, such as sanctions or a military response, being authorised at the UN 
Security Council under chapter VII. This would be a possibility if the external engagement 
was perceived as a threat to international peace and security, and the absence of a consensual 
basis would increase the chances of such an occurrence. Moreover, there would also be the 
potential for other states to interpret the action as an armed attack, and, consequently, come to 
the aid of the targeted state under the doctrine of collective self-defence. This would require 
an express request from the targeted state,
117
 but it is worth highlighting that there is 
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precedent for this requirement being waived where the delay it would bring would lead to 
devastating consequences for the state and its people.
118
 
 
In sum, whether international actors have benevolent or more self-interested motivations for 
becoming involved in post-conflict reconstruction, there are strong legal and political reasons 
for why they would want to initiate their intervention in a manner that is consistent with the 
law of self-determination. This finding increases the significance of what the law of self-
determination requires in terms of the initiation of international involvement, as it indicates 
that regardless of the implications for the stability of the post-conflict situation, international 
actors are not likely to proceed without at least attempting to comply. However, it is also 
apparent that the law of self-determination is far from demanding in what it requires as an 
expression of the will of the people for the initiation of large-scale international involvement. 
This reflects a lack of correspondence between the status that is afforded the principle self-
determination (both in international politics and the fledgling normative hierarchy of 
international law) and the manner in which the norm has been developed as an international 
legal concept. In the normal run of things, the underdeveloped nature of the legal concept of 
self-determination is concealed by the fact that the government will have effective control of 
the state, which provides a basis for identifying it as the embodiment of the will of the 
people. In the post-conflict situation there is no effective government, and this has 
consequences for both the usefulness and sustainability of the law of self-determination as the 
legal framework for local ownership of the initiation of international involvement. These 
consequences can be illustrated through consideration of how the law relates to practice from 
the last twenty years.
119
  
 
4. The Practice of the Initiation of International Involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction 
 
In the practice post-conflict reconstruction, in spite of circumstances of political flux, the 
right to self-determination has not been abandoned. In some instances the commitment of the 
lead actors to the right to self-determination has been expressed in key documents and 
resolutions setting out the basis for international involvement and plans for how to enhance 
the transitional period.
120
 More meaningful, however, in terms of attempts to render the 
practice consistent with the legal right to self-determination, have been the attempts to initiate 
involvement on a consensual basis.
121
 In fact, over the last two decades, only in Iraq, when it 
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was formally occupied by the coalition forces, has there been international engagement in a 
reconstruction process that undoubtedly operated without any consensual basis. In this 
instance, the Security Council arguably provided a legal basis for activity beyond the law of 
occupation;
122
 but this did not remove the underlying inconsistency with the legal right to 
self-determination.
123
 
 
It does not follow, of course, that all the other examples of post-conflict reconstruction have 
operated on valid consent. For instance, in relation to Kosovo and East Timor, while there 
was some evidence of consent from states with a claim to title over the territory in question 
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Portugal and Indonesia),
124
 the respective international 
administrations proceeded with only loose evidence of a desire for the initiation of the 
international involvement in the form it took from the affected people (earlier peace 
agreement signed by Kosovan leaders but not FRY; and vote for independence East 
Timor).
125
 This brings into doubt the consistency of the initiation of the international 
involvement with the legal right to self-determination.
126
 And this can help to explain why in 
both situations there was a broad chapter VII authorisation which covered not only the 
military presence, but also the internationally administered reconstruction process. It might 
also be queried whether governments that have been formed largely as a result of 
international initiatives, as has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, should have the 
competence to exercise the right of the people to self-determination.
127
 However, in line with 
what was set out above about the consequences for governmental status that can follow from 
international recognition, the interim governments in these instances have all been treated as 
if they had the competence to offer valid consent to the international involvement.
128
 
 
Still, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti and most of the other examples noted below, the request 
for international participation has been followed by a Security Council Chapter VII 
authorisation for at least – and often only for – the activities of the international military 
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presence.
129
 Only in relation to the Solomon Islands was there no chapter VII authorisation 
for at least some of the involvement.
130
 There are a number of possible reasons for seeking an 
additional legal justification in the form of a chapter VII authorisation. One possibility is that 
some states might find it easier in terms of domestic politics to provide military assistance 
when there is a chapter VII authorisation.
131
 There is also the fact that consent is not a pre-
requisite for the exercise of chapter VII powers, thus, if consent was to be withdrawn, those 
aspects authorised under chapter VII could remain in place.
132
 Moreover, two legal 
justifications can also be seen as a pre-emptive step to deter any challenges to the legality of 
the international involvement, which, in turn, could undermine the legitimacy of the 
reconstruction process.
133
 In this respect, it is also important to highlight the possibility of the 
endorsement of a government in a chapter VII resolution helping to persuade any undecided 
states that the purported government does enjoy governmental status.
134
 It should be stressed 
that none of these reasons affect the view that consent is likely to be central to the securing of 
agreement at the Council on the chapter VII resolution, because of what consent symbolises 
in terms of the preservation of the right to self-determination and sovereignty.
135
 
 
It is also important to note that, although consent in post-conflict situations has often been 
sourced from governments without independent effective control of the territory, there have 
been examples of situations where consent has come from a source with some degree of 
effective control. For instance, in relation to the Solomon Islands, Australia acted before the 
government had lost all control. More specifically, Australia provided military, technical and 
financial assistance to keep the government in authority and enable it to reconstruct the 
state.
136
 Still, as it appeared inevitable that the government would lose what little control it 
had, the control was hardly reliable evidence in terms of identifying an embodiment of the 
will of the people. A central concern in the discussion below is whether it is appropriate for 
the legal right to self-determination to be so easily satisfied with regard to the initiation of 
international involvement that will at least enable, if not direct, post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
A. The Usefulness of the Present Approach to Legal Regulation of Local Ownership 
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In Afghanistan, the circumstances meant it was particularly challenging to find consent from 
a government with anything like a meaningful claim to be an embodiment of the will of the 
people. This was a result of the US-led coalition, which toppled the Taliban regime in 
October 2001, creating a governmental and security vacuum.
137
 Ultimately, consent was 
provided by the Afghan Interim Authority. This government was created in December 2001, 
after having been selected by eminent Afghans
138
 invited to an UN-backed conference in 
Bonn in November 2001.
 139
 It was – like every Afghan government since – dependent on an 
international military presence for any control over Afghan territory.
140
 Yet, in the light of the 
widespread international support for the international engagement as a whole, following the 
events of September 11
th
 2001 in the USA, this lack of control was not a bar to it being seen 
as the government as a matter of international law. As such, in spite of little claim to be an 
embodiment of the will of the people, it was treated as competent to consent to the military 
presence and the mass of other international assistance which enabled it to gain some control 
and start with the reconstruction.
141
 This obviously represented little real concern for the 
political principle of self-determination. One might also be concerned that the consensual 
basis was simply a means for the international actors to avoid responsibility for their 
actions.
142
 However, the circumstances were such that there needed to be immediate 
commencement with the reconstruction of the state. The alternative was stagnation, which 
would hardly have helped to convince the people of the sense in removing the Taliban from 
governance.  
 
If the law had been more demanding in terms of the level of coincidence required between 
the request for international involvement and the will of the people, then this would have 
created major complications in terms of how to proceed in Afghanistan. It would perhaps still 
have been possible, in the light of the rationale for the involvement as a whole (response to 
September 11
th
 2001), to secure a chapter VII basis for the involvement. Yet, a more stringent 
requirement in terms of sourcing the will of the people would have affected the extent to 
which it was possible to portray the international involvement as leaving only a light foot 
print, in the sense of reconstruction being led by a domestic government;
143
 an approach 
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which particularly the US judged was appropriate for the context.
144
 This is because, if the 
entity identified as the domestic government did not have the competence to invite, or ask to 
leave, the international assistance, it would be much more difficult for it to be distinguished 
from a group of local actors working on behalf of the international actors, and the perception 
of the internationals as imperialists would be strengthened.
145
 As such, the condition of the 
underdeveloped law of self-determination can be seen to have contributed to the legitimacy 
and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of the involvement.
146
  
 
A somewhat similar series of events also occurred in Iraq. In Iraq, though, there had already 
been a period of reconstruction under the law of occupation. This was hindered by significant 
levels of domestic resistance, which, in turn, affected the stability of the situation.
147
 Such 
instability accompanied by the obvious need to make progress with the reconstruction can 
help to explain the move to identify and transfer authority to a domestic government.
148
 The 
selection of the interim government that followed was heavily influenced by international 
preferences and dependent on international support for its authority and ability to lead the 
reconstruction.
149
 Nonetheless, it received widespread international recognition as the 
government of Iraq;
 150
 with the Security Council taking care to highlight that this 
government had the authority to ask the international actors to leave, even insisting that the 
chapter VII mandate for international involvement would be terminated if so requested.
151
 
The consensual basis the interim government provided for the international actors was 
deemed sufficient by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to bring a formal 
end of application of the law of occupation.
152
 This formal reclassification of the nature of the 
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international involvement did not extinguish all domestic resistance.
 153  
Nonetheless, it can 
still be seen as an important step in the progress of Iraq towards an independent and stable 
future. In particular, this is because from this point onwards the reconstruction process was 
no longer hindered by doubts about the legality of change and development under the law of 
occupation – a facet which can hardly have been conducive to the domestic or international 
acceptance of the practice.
154
  
 
Another reason to appreciate the present condition of the law on self-determination is that it 
can be seen to have been conducive to the conclusion of peace agreements; agreements that 
have ushered in and provided a framework for the stability and progress of the post-conflict 
stage in some situations. It is common for at least some of the parties to a peace agreement to 
want the signing of the agreement to be followed by the initiation of considerable 
international involvement, which will help maintain order in the transitional period but also 
assist with the reconstruction. For instance, in relation to Cambodia, a relatively short period 
of international involvement, including direct governance was introduced in 1991 as part of 
the peacemaking process that sought to bring the main factions together and end the conflict 
that had plagued Cambodia, to varying degrees, throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
155
 Another 
example is found in the recent past of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here, the conflict was ended 
with the Dayton Agreement of November 1995,
156
 which brought together the three main 
warring factions and set out the terms for peace, including provision for significant, 
eventually long-term, international involvement.
157
 More recently, in Liberia in 2003, large-
scale international involvement was invited as part of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement,
158
 and has since proceeded to keep the transitional government that was selected 
by warring factions and, subsequently, the elected government in authority.
159
 The 
circumstances in which these agreements were negotiated have many differences. 
Commonly, though, from the perspective of self-determination, there is reason to query the 
basis for treating the participants in the peace processes as an embodiment of the will of the 
people. In particular, none of the parties to any of the agreements had managed to sustain 
independent effective control of the territory in question.
160
 As such, international recognition 
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must be a prominent part of the explanation for why in each instance there was the legal 
capacity to provide a consensual basis for the international involvement. The important point 
is that in all three of these examples, if the law had been more demanding in terms of a 
demonstration of the will of the people for international involvement, there would have been 
a risk of at least complicating the initiation of international involvement. This might not have 
prevented a peace agreement in any of the examples, but it could certainly have hindered the 
peace process. For instance, any party that harbored doubts about the commencement of 
large-scale international engagement could have used the law to their advantage in the 
negotiating process.
161
  
 
The issue of evidence of the will of the people appears to have hardly affected the peace 
processes in Liberia, Bosnia, or Cambodia. In this respect, though, events in Cambodia are 
still particularly noteworthy. In the Cambodia context, international recognition was 
essentially split between the two main factions: the People‘s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
(supported by the Soviet Bloc) and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK) (supported the US, China, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)).
162
 Consequently, there was not ‗a single government accepted by all states as 
politically legitimate and legally able to delegate power‘.163 But there was – in the absence of 
legal criteria for determining which had the stronger claim to be the government – a basis for 
both sides to claim that they had the international legal authority to invite large-scale 
international to give them control of the state. If the international actors had accepted such an 
invitation, it would have led to a massive aggravation of both the situation and international 
order; a point reflected in the fact that the Security Council refused to authorise international 
involvement until there was agreement amongst the factions.
164
 Instead, international efforts 
facilitated the bringing together of the two main factions to form a single entity, the Supreme 
National Council, which was created solely for the purpose of consenting to the international 
involvement;
165
 involvement which then oversaw an electoral process to identify a single 
government. Subsequent events suggest that the situation could have benefited from a 
different approach to international engagement.
166
 This does not detract from the view that 
the situation as it stood at the time was aided by delaying international involvement until 
agreement on the form it should take could be reached between the two factions.  
 
The approach taken to sourcing an expression of the will of the people in Cambodia can be 
seen as a responsible exercise of the discretion that international actors are afforded under 
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international law, in terms of identifying an embodiment of the will of the people. That is, 
while there was the possibility of an arguably valid source of consent for large-scale 
international involvement – which, if valid, would have reconciled the practice with the legal 
right to self-determination regardless of the actual connection between the source of consent 
and the will of the people – the international actors were right not to seek to encourage such a 
course of action. This is because one consequence would have been a likely destabilisation of 
the path the state was on towards an independent and effective future, which appeared 
dependent on bringing the two factions together. Another consequence, of the fact that the 
circumstances were clearly not suited to international engagement at this time, would have 
been a lack of wider international acceptance and support. This latter aspect is a reflection of 
the idea that although gains in terms of security and human rights, from an international 
intervention, are likely to make a clear departure from the political principle of self-
determination more acceptable for the wider international society of states, the contrary is 
also true. The willingness of international actors to exercise their discretion responsibly 
appears, as is now turned to, central to the sustainability of the present approach to legal 
regulation of local ownership of the decision to initiate international involvement. 
 
B.  The Sustainability of the Present Approach to Legal Regulation of Local Ownership 
 
In terms of large-scale international involvement proceeding on what can more readily be 
seen as a meaningful request from the people, two examples which stand out are those of 
Haiti in 1994 and Sierra Leone in 1998. Firstly, in 1994, large-scale involvement restored the 
exiled government of Aristide to authority in Haiti. Then, in 1998, there was eventually 
enough international support to enable the exiled government of Kabbah to be restored to 
authority in Sierra Leone. Both of these governments, before being removed from office by 
rebel uprisings, had been elected in internationally monitored elections. Thus in spite of a 
lack of control of the territory, they had a strong claim to be an embodiment of the will of the 
people. This underpinned the widespread continuation of international recognition, and helps 
to explain the motivation for extensive international involvement in their favour, in spite of 
the emergence of other governments in both situations with competing claims to 
governmental status.
167
 Following the international intervention in Haiti, the stability of the 
situation was affected by the policy decisions of the government, particularly an 
unwillingness to co-operate with the international actors.
168
 In Sierra Leone, the government, 
and the period of reconstruction it directed, eventually ushered in a period of stability which 
since 2005 has been sustained without an international military presence.
169
  
 
The success of the reconstruction effort in Sierra Leone – relative to the difficulties that have 
been encountered in other situations where international involvement has proceeded on the 
basis of a request from an agent with a weaker claim to be an embodiment of the will of the 
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people –170might be seen as a reason to craft new criteria for governmental status in post-
conflict situations based on democratic credentials. However, one needs only to think about 
how these criteria would have operated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Liberia, and Bosnia 
Herzegovina –  potentially hindering the initiation of international involvement and with it 
the stability of the situation – to understand why at no point, in debates at the UN at least,171 
was there any effort from the lead actors concerned with Sierra Leone to suggest that the 
governmental status as a matter of international law was directly based on democratic 
credentials. One consequence of this decision to not seek to develop the law of law of self-
determination is that the potential for a misuse of the discretion that international law affords 
lead actors to determine the will of the people has not been reduced. Indeed, one of the most 
striking examples which might be queried as an irresponsible exercise of the discretion was in 
Haiti in 2004. 
 
In Haiti in 2004, amidst considerable unrest, instead of backing the elected government, the 
same international actors encouraged President Aristide, the same President who had 
previously been supported in 1994, to step down. This led to an internationally facilitated 
selection process for a new government. This process involved discussions between a three-
member council, which consisted of a representative of Aristide‘s party, one from the main 
opposition party, and one international representative. Together they selected seven eminent 
persons to identify a Prime Minister, Gérard Latortue, who then selected his government.
172
 
This government would not have enjoyed anything like control of the state without the 
massive international military presence that it invited.
173
 And without sustained financial and 
technical assistance,
174
 the government would not have been able to pursue any of the 
reconstruction projects that it agreed to in the 2004 Interim Co-operation Framework for 
Haiti.
175
 The inconsistency of this approach with the political principle of self-determination 
can help to explain the reluctance of CARICOM to recognise the new government.
176
 
However, because there was still considerable international recognition, this did not affect the 
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validity of the consent or the consequent satisfaction of the legal right to self-determination. 
One can, though, understand why external onlookers might be concerned. This was the 
government that the people had elected and international actors were making the 
determination that it was no longer fit to govern. Still, the circumstances support the view 
that this was a responsible exercise of the discretion that international law affords 
international actors. More specifically, it was apparent that the policies of the elected 
government were now a major cause of the unrest. Accordingly, to have assisted this 
government would have been majorly counter-productive for the stability of the situation. 
This example does, though, serve to illustrate the difficulties that can be involved in making 
the assessment of when the context is such that it justifies a departure from the principle of 
self-determination. In this respect, events in Somalia in 2006/2007 represent what can be seen 
as a far less persuasive exercise of the discretion. 
 
Towards the end of 2006, Somalia had two entities both claiming to be the government of 
Somalia. Nonetheless, there was reported to be more peace and order than Somalia had 
known for 15 years.
177
 One entity was the Transitional Federal Government, the existence of 
which can be traced back to the 2004 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-
led Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, which brought prominent Somalian‘s 
together in Nairobi. Established in exile, this government was not democratically elected, nor 
had it been able to gain meaningful independent control over the territory. As such, it hardly 
represented an embodiment of the will of the people. Nonetheless, it considered itself and 
received international recognition as the sole government of Somalia;
178
 a key factor in this 
respect must be its commitment to eventually hold elections.
179
  
 
In 2006, the Transitional Federal Government had its seat in Baidoa, having lost the capital, 
Mogadishu, and 8 of the country‘s 18 administrative regions to the other entity competing to 
be seen as the government, the Union of Islamic Courts. The latter being an alliance between 
militant Islamist groups, clan courts which applied Islamic law, and businessmen. This 
alliance was formed in 2004 as a means to better protect its members from warlords.
180
 The 
Union of Islamic Courts is reported to have believed it had considerable support amongst the 
people of Somalia, but patrols by its hardcore militiamen men are a reason to query how 
much this support was genuine rather than coerced.
181
 This latter aspect, and suspicions of 
harbouring Al Qaeda, must help to explain why its commitment to, eventual, democratic rule 
did not engender more international support.
182
 In sum, both entities enjoyed some degree of 
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control of the territory, but both lacked any other real evidence that they should be treated as 
an embodiment the will of the people.  
 
Nonetheless, international recognition strongly favoured one government over the other. 
Accordingly, in the light of what was set out above regarding international law on 
governmental status, the Transitional Federal Government arguably had the legal capacity to 
invite the type of large-scale international involvement that would put it in control of the 
state. Given the context, however, it could hardly be deemed in the best interests of the 
stability of the situation for such a course of action. Instead, the responsible approach would 
be, as had generally been the case up until October 2006, for international actors to prioritise 
the political principle of self-determination, delay extensive intervention, and work to 
facilitate negotiation between the two sides in order to produce a government with a stronger 
claim to be an embodiment of the will of the people.  
 
In October 2006, there were clashes between militia of the Islamic Courts and forces allied to 
the Federal Transitional Government only 60km from the Transitional Government in 
Baidoa.
183
 This helps to explain the request of the African Union (AU) and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for the Security Council to adopt a 
chapter VII resolution to authorise the deployment of an AU/IGAD force to protect the 
Transitional Federal Government. The Council issued SC Res. 1725 on 6
th
 December 2006. 
This authorised, under chapter VII, the IGAD and Member States of the African Union to 
establish a protection and training mission in Somalia. The main thrust of the mandate was to 
provide protection for the Transitional Government. More specifically, the aim was to secure 
the continued existence of the Transitional Government rather than increase its control.
184
 
Amongst other things, the resolution also emphasized the need, in the interests of stability of 
the situation, for continued dialogue between the Transitional Government and the Union of 
Islamic Courts. Although the Transitional Federal Government welcomed the resolution, the 
Union rejected it, seeing it as ‗tantamount to an invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia.‘185 This was 
in spite of the fact that the resolution endorsed ‗the specification in the IGAD Deployment 
Plan that those States that border Somalia would not deploy troops to Somalia‘186 (which 
would include Ethiopia). Following the issuance of the resolution without the consent of the 
Union, the Union‘s militia advanced closer to Baidoa.187 Then, contrary to what the SC had 
endorsed, at the end of December 2006, Ethiopia‘s military became heavily involved on the 
side of the Transitional Federal Government. Fighting alongside the Government‘s forces, the 
Ethiopian‘s enabled the removal of the Union from authority in Mogadishu and installed the 
Transitional Federal Government.
188
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Subsequently, the Transitional Federal Government has remained dependent on an 
internationally military presence. This was first from Ethiopian forces, and then from African 
Union Members (other than Ethiopia). The latter were also invited by the government but, in 
contrast to the Ethiopians, the legal basis for their operations has been buttressed by a series 
of chapter VII resolutions.
189
 More recently, the government has been made more inclusive 
and the situation in Somalia has shown signs of starting to stabilise again.
190
 Nonetheless, 
these advances can hardly be attributed to the efforts of Ethiopia, especially as their removal 
from the state has been central to the willingness of certain groups to co-operate with the 
government.
191
  
 
It might be possible to argue that Ethiopia was prohibited from becoming involved on the 
basis of consent from the transitional government, as a result of the Security Council 
endorsement of the IGAD plan, which excluded Ethiopia. Leaving this possibility to one side, 
the example highlights the accountability gap that exists in the present legal framework with 
regard to the identification of an embodiment of the will of the people for the initiation of 
international participation in post-conflict reconstruction. That is, in spite of the fact that 
there was little to connect it to the will of the people or that the context would benefit, 
Ethiopia was arguably free to become involved in support of the government because this 
government enjoyed extensive international recognition.
192
 Such a course of action would 
have a claim to be consistent with the legal right to self-determination, but would clearly run 
contrary to the underlying political principle. 
 
This accountability gap has implications for the stability of post-conflict situations, the self-
determination of peoples, and international order. However, to close this gap would require 
specification of criteria as to when a government is sufficiently attached to the will of the 
people to be able to make a request on their behalf for internationally facilitated 
reconstruction of the state and civil infrastructure. Such criteria would help to protect the 
notion of self-determination at stake, and one might argue that the Security Council could 
authorise action wherever there was a difficulty in sourcing consent. However, along with the 
problem of selectivity at the Security Council, there is the fact that valid consent itself is 
often central to a willingness to authorise international involvement.  And then there are the 
benefits, highlighted above, that the fact of valid consent in and of itself can bring to the 
stability of a situation. Ultimately, then, from the perspective of the stability of post-conflict 
situations it would seem preferable not to have such criteria. 
 
 Moreover, the fact that Somalia is the one example where this accountability gap has really 
been noticeable – because elsewhere there has tended to be a strong contextual justification 
for accepting consent from a government with little claim to be an embodiment of the will of 
the people – suggests that in reality the need for new law is not that pressing from the 
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perspective of self-determination and international order. However, it is apparent that many 
more examples along the lines of Ethiopia‘s engagement in Somalia, and calls will be made 
from an international society, which is caught between solidarist and pluralist elements, for a 
strengthening of the law. Accordingly, to encourage the sustainability of the existing, 
underdeveloped, legal framework, and preserve the attendant benefits for the stability of post-
conflict situations, it would seem imperative that international actors continue to exercise 
their discretion responsibly. This means refusing to initiate involvement on the basis of a 
request from a government with little claim to be an embodiment of the will of the people, 
unless there is strong contextual justification for such a course of action.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has highlighted that the law which presently regulates local ownership of the 
initiation of international involvement in the aftermath of war was not crafted with this 
setting in mind. It has also set out that, in the light of the present condition of international 
society, compliance with the law of self-determination remains central to international order. 
Still, the law of self-determination has been shown to have hardly hindered the practice of 
large-scale international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction over the last twenty 
years. This is in the sense that even in those situations where nothing like an accurate 
expression of the will of the people has been possible, provided there has been consent from a 
government with some degree of international recognition, the law of self-determination has 
been satisfied. Consequently, the law has not been an incentive for a pro-active approach 
towards local ownership, but it has also not hindered the international involvement where it 
has been deemed necessary. This is a reflection of the underdeveloped nature of the law of 
self-determination, in terms of criteria for identifying an agent for the rights of a people.  
 
In most of the examples considered in this article, where consent has come from a 
government with only a minimal claim to popular legitimacy, such an approach to local 
ownership has been justified on the essential, and readily apparent, need for international 
engagement to help with the transition from conflict to long-term peace. Consequently, 
although the political principle of self-determination at stake has to some extent been 
compromised, this has enabled gains in terms of security and human rights. These gains will 
have helped to engender wider international support and acceptance amongst an international 
society, which remains committed to the principle of self-determination but is increasingly 
moving away from its pluralist roots to a more solidarist foundation.  
 
Events in Somalia demonstrate that the underdeveloped nature of the law of self-
determination not only leaves open the possibility of international actors becoming involved 
in a situation without meaningful expression of the will of the people, but also becoming 
involved where there is not a strong contextual justification. When there are no clear gains for 
the stability of a situation, then the contravention of the political principle of self-
determination is far more likely to be met with concern, than support, from the wider 
international society of states. Presently, the Somalia example stands alone, in terms of an 
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example of an irresponsible exercise of the discretion that international actors are afforded to 
determine when a request for their involvement is a sufficient reflection of the will of the 
people. However, if there is more practice of states becoming involved on the basis of 
consent from an ineffective but internationally recognised government before the context is 
ready, then there can be expected to be calls for a strengthening of the legal framework 
through criteria for when a government is competent to consent. Such law would help to 
enhance consistency with the political principle of self-determination, but would not be 
desirable from the point of view of the stability of the situation. In particular, it could serve to 
hinder the initiation of international involvement in instances where the criteria could not be 
met. 
 
Accordingly, this article suggests that it would be preferable for the accountability gap to 
remain. However, it also recognises that, if this is to be feasible, international actors must 
adopt a responsible approach to local ownership of the decision to initiate international 
involvement in post-conflict situations. This entails international actors refusing to initiate 
involvement on the basis of a request from a government with little claim to be an 
embodiment of the will of the people, unless there is strong contextual justification for such a 
course of action.  
 
However, it is also apparent that the distinction between a context which justifies 
commencement of international engagement in a manner that is, essentially, ignorant of the 
will of the people, and one where the principle of self-determination should be prioritised and 
the international presence delayed, is not always going to be easy to make. Thus this article 
should also be seen as call for more research into the type of circumstances that would 
justify, for instance, the type of intervention witnessed in Haiti, where an elected government 
was replaced by a part internationally selected, non-elected, government.   
 
Finally, this article has demonstrated how consent from a government in a post-conflict 
situation is not the same as in a functioning state, in terms of reconciling international 
involvement in the affairs of a state with the political principle of self-determination or 
enhancing the stability of the situation. On this basis, this article should be seen as reason for 
more attention to be given, in the policy work on best practice for local ownership, to the 
initiation of international involvement in post-conflict situations. One suggestion would be to 
investigate possible means by which international actors could look beyond the government 
and engage with civil society and affected communities in the decision to commence 
involvement.
193
 By looking away from the law for a method to improve consistency with the 
political principle of self-determination, such research would help to reduce the need for new 
law, which would be unlikely to be as useful to the stability of post-conflict situations as the 
present approach to this aspect of legal regulation of local ownership has been. 
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